West versus East: Early Globalization and the Great Divergence by Rafael, Dobado-González et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
West versus East: Early Globalization
and the Great Divergence
Dobado-Gonza´lez Rafael and Garc´ıa-Hiernaux Alfredo and
Guerrero-Burbano David
Departamento de Historia e Instituciones econo´micas II Facultad de
CC. Econo´micas y Empresariales. Universidad Complutense de
Madrid, Departamento de Fundamentos y Ana´lisis Econo´mico II.
Facultad de CC. Econo´micas y Empresariales. Universidad
Complutense de Madrid, Centro Universitario de Estudios
Financieros, Madrid
July 2013
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/48773/
MPRA Paper No. 48773, posted 2. August 2013 09:30 UTC
 1 
West versus East: Early Globalization and the Great Divergence1
Rafael Dobado-González
 
2, Alfredo García-Hiernaux3 and David Guerrero-Burbano4
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper extends our previous work on grain market integration across Europe and 
the Americas in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Dobado, García-Hiernaux 
and Guerrero, 2012). By using the same econometric methodology, we now present: 1) 
a search for statistical evidence in the East of an “Early Globalization” comparable to 
the one ongoing in the West by mid eighteenth century; 2) a study on the integration of 
grain markets in China and Japan and its functioning in comparison to Western 
countries; 3) a discussion of the relevance of our findings for the debate on the Great 
Divergence.  Our main conclusions are: 1) substantial differences in the degree of 
integration and the functioning of grain markets are observed between East and West; 
2) a certain degree of integration may be reached through different combinations of 
factors (agents, policies, etc.) and with dissimilar effects on long-run economic growth; 
3) the absence of an “Early Globalization” in the East reveals the existence of some 
economic and institutional limitations in this part of the world and contributed to its 
“Great Divergence” with the West from at least the eighteenth century. 
 
 
Resumen 
 
Este trabajo expande nuestra investigación previa sobre la integración del mercado de 
granos en Europa y América (Dobado, García-Hiernaux y Guerrero, 2012). Usando la 
misma metodología econométrica, presentamos ahora: 1) la búsqueda de evidencia 
estadística en el Este de una “Globalización temprana” semejante a la encontrada en 
el Oeste desde mediados del siglo XVIII; 2) un estudio de la integración de los 
mercados en china y Japón y su funcionamiento en comparación con los países 
occidentales; 3) una discusión de la relevancia de nuestros resultados respecto al 
debate sobre la “Gran Divergencia”. Nuestras principales conclusiones son: 1) 
encontramos diferencias sustanciales entre Este y Oeste en lo que al grado de 
integración y al funcionamiento de los mercados de grano se refiere; 2) un cierto grado 
de integración puede ser alcanzado mediante combinaciones diferentes de factores 
(agentes, políticas, etc.) y con efectos distintos sobre el crecimiento económico a largo 
plazo; 3) la ausencia de una “Globalización temprana” en el Este revela la existencia 
de limitaciones económicas e institucionales en esta parte del mundo y contribuyó a la 
“Gran Divergencia” con el Oeste desde al menos el siglo XVIII. 
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This paper presents a preliminary attempt at contributing to two important 
brands of economic literature: 1) Globalization (i.e., international market integration); 
and 2) “Great Divergence” between East and West. It does so by means of a twofold 
research strategy that combines theoretically-based (Law of One Price) econometric 
work with empirically well-founded, albeit somewhat speculative, traditional economic 
history.  
It is our contention that the absence in the East of the intra- and intercontinental 
grain market integration found by Dobado et al. (2012) in the West as early as by mid 
eighteenth century may be interpreted as a form of Western exceptionalism. We 
identify several significant dissimilarities between West and East concerning grain 
market integration: geo-economic scope (intra- and intercontinental versus national); 
evolution over time (secular progress versus reversal in the nineteenth century); role of 
agents (market forces versus state and others as leading forces) and policies (relative 
openness to foreign trade versus relative closeness). Therefore, West and East were 
different in this important respect both before and after the Industrial Revolution. 
The restrictive trade policy practiced by the East (China, Japan and Korea) 
might have been one of the biggest economic policy mistakes ever committed since it 
prevented that part of the world from taking advantage of the direct (static and dynamic 
gains) and indirect (institutional) benefits resulting from the expansion of foreign trade 
during the Early Modern Era. 
However, in spite of its importance, the absence of international grain market 
integration has not yet considered in the debate on the “Great Divergence”. Basically 
based on the pursuit of internal policy goals, the closing of the Eastern economies 
during the Early Modern Era has been one of the biggest mistakes of economic policy 
ever made since it contributed to the “Great Divergence” well before 1800.  
Aside from this introduction, the paper comprises: 1) a first section in which the 
historical processes of Globalization and Great Divergence are discussed; 2) a second 
section that presents the econometric methodology and the main results of our 
empirical work; and 3) a summary of our chief conclusions in the third section. 
 
 
1. Globalization and Great Divergence 
 
When did globalization start? The answer to this question depends on how 
globalization is defined. De Vries (2010) distinguishes between “soft” and “hard” 
globalization. Flynn and Giráldez claim that “soft globalization” started “when the Old 
World became directly connected with the Americas in 1571 via Manila.” 5  “Hard 
globalization” is defined by O’Rourke and Williamson as “integration of markets across 
space”. 6 For well-founded theoretical and empirical reasons, this definition is more 
popular among economists. Therefore, it is the one adopted here. Then, globalization 
started in the West by the first half of the eighteenth century when grain markets 
became increasingly integrated within Europe and between Europe and the US -see 
Dobado, García-Hiernaux and Guerrero (2012).7
Our econometric methodology, supplemented with substantial historical 
evidence, permits us to offer a new perspective on the globalization process that 
somewhat differs from one established in their pioneering works by O’Rourke and 
Williamson (1999, 2002a, 2002b and 2004) –see Figure 1 and Figure 2. Thus, starting 
in the first half of the eighteenth century, globalization predated rather than followed the 
 
                                                        
5 Flynn and Giráldez, 2004, p. 82. 
6 O’Rourke and Williamson, 2004, p. 109. 
7 Throughout this paper, despite its vagueness, the term “West” refers to the US and Europe, 
not including the Ottoman Empire. “East” is also a vague concept. Hereinafter, “East” means 
China and Japan. On top of deep historical reasons, that meaning is consistent with the content 
of this paper. India has been consciously left outside that “East”.    
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first instance of modern economic growth, the Industrial Revolution. This important 
finding might have been previously overlooked because intercontinental market 
integration was interrupted by the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792-
1815) and their aftermath.8
The dramatic expansion of foreign trade across the West in the Early Modern 
Era delivered significant economic benefits. The direct impact of foreign trade (e.g. via 
specialization, expansion of internal markets, etc.) on economic growth has been 
recognized since long time ago by economists. In this respect, despite all due 
qualifications, the contrast between a relatively “open” West and a relatively “closed” 
East (e.g., haijin and cohong in, respectively, Ming and Qing China and sakoku and 
kaikin in Tokugawa Japan) is apparent.
 When globalization regained momentum, it then coincided 
with –and was favoured by- the spread of the Industrial Revolution throughout Europe 
and the US. We term the pre-1792 intra- and intercontinental integration of grain 
markets as “Early Globalization”. Latin American countries, with the possible partial 
exception of Chile due to its trade on wheat with Peru, did not join the “Early 
Globalization”.    
9 Adam Smith wrote that the “Chinese have little 
respect for foreign trade”.10
The West relative openness resulted into a dynamic Atlantic trade -the Baltic 
and the Mediterranean being interconnected to it- on which the Early Globalization was 
based. Additionally, the Atlantic trade significantly contributed through an indirect 
institutional channel to the “First Great Divergence”: the unprecedented economic 
growth that Europe experienced between 1500 and 1800 (Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson, 2005).
 The seclusion policy set in place by the edicts of the 1630’s 
is one of the main characteristics of Tokugawa Japan.  
11 According to these authors, large profits generated by the Atlantic 
trade, especially in Britain and the Netherlands, increased the political bargaining 
power of the commercial interests which induced significant institutional change of the 
type (i.e. secure property rights) that favoured economic growth in pre-industrial 
Europe. Moreover, Morris (2010) suggests that the challenge represented by the 
“Atlantic frontier” acted as a powerful incentive for the West to find scientifically-based 
answers to practical problems. By doing so, it promoted divergence from the East in 
long-term social –and economic- development since the early 1770’s “or thereabouts”. 
On the contrary, the “steppe frontier” proved much less stimulating for China. In spite of 
its importance, the growing overland trade with Russia in the eighteenth century –that 
somewhat substituted for the declining Silk Road- was even smaller than the limited 
maritime commerce that took place at Canton under the cohong system with the early-
globalized Western countries.12
                                                        
8  O’Rourke (2006) has shown the disruptive effects of this cycle of wars on the Atlantic 
economy but might have underestimated the level of market integration effectively reached in 
the West prior to the early 1790s. 
 
9 In spite of Western mercantilism, trade policies in China or Japan were incomparably more 
restrictive, including from phases of autarchy or very limited contact with foreigners to the total 
evacuation of some coastal areas of South-eastern China -see Findlay and O’Rourke (2007).  
10 Taken from Millar, 2011, p. 205. This author finds in European sources “a consistent narrative 
of frustration” originated by the meeting between “European ambitions of achieving a bountiful 
of trading relationship with China, met with the reality of Chinese restrictions.” Ibidem, pp. 206-
207. 
11 “Atlantic trade”, in these authors’ opinion, “means trade with the New World, as well as trade 
with Asia via the Atlantic, and includes colonialism- and slavery-related activities” (Acemoglu et 
al., 2005, p. 546). However, the growing integration across the “early globalizing West” (i.e., an 
imprecise, changing, and porous space stretching from Pennsylvania to the Danzig-Vienna-
Milan arch –see Dobado et al. (2012)-) could not but to reinforce the institutional effect of the 
“Atlantic trade” à la Acemoglu et al. (2005). Actually, trade within Western Europe alone was 
bigger than with the rest of the world circa 1790 (O’Rourke, Prados and Daudin, 2008). 
12 See Findlay and O’Rourke, 20007, pp. 284-300. 
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That the increase in foreign trade contributed to economic growth in Meiji Japan 
is widely accepted by economists and economic historians. According to Bernhofen 
and Brown (2005), the static gains to Japan resulting from the opening-up of its 
economy were close to ten per cent of the GDP. Recently, Keller, Li and Shiue (2012) 
have shown the importance of the opening of China to foreign trade through Shanghai 
after the Opium War for the long-run growth performance of the country. 
The idea that the East had fallen behind the West economically before the 
Industrial Revolution is long lasting and influential.13 Nonetheless, since the late 1990s 
it has been challenged by a stimulating revisionist view on the comparative levels of 
economic development at the two ends of Eurasia.14 As a consequence of its criticism 
to aspects of previous explanations of the rise of Europe, further quantitative research 
has been conducted. It has yielded interesting results. Some of them are relevant to 
the aim of this paper. The beginning of the “Early Globalization” seems to have 
occurred at a point in time when indications of the Great Divergence between West -or 
at least its most advanced parts- and East can be found. In the eighteenth century, 
living standards in London and Amsterdam were higher than in Chinese (Suzhou, 
Beijing and Canton) or Japanese (Kyoto/Tokyo) towns (Allen, Bassino, Ma, Moll-
Murata and Van Zanden, 2011). These authors conclude that the comparisons of living 
standards “paint a less optimistic picture of Asian performance than the revisionists 
suggest.”15 This conclusion is consistent with the turning point observed “somewhere 
between 1750 and 1800” in the respective regional values of the index of social 
development built by Morris (2010): for the first time since the sixth century, the East 
was surpassed by the West.16
Li and Van Zanden (2012) estimate that differences between two of the most 
advanced economies in Europe and China (the Netherlands and Hua-Lou, part of the 
Yangtze delta, respectively) were significant already in the 1820s. GDP per capita was 
almost ninety per cent higher in the Netherlands than in the Hua-Lou area. Moreover, 
these authors suggest that in 1820 –it is to say, before the spread of the Industrial 
Revolution across the Continent – relative GDP per capita between Western Europe 
and China might be not far from the one estimated by Maddison.
  
17
However, the revisionist view on the comparative levels of development in East 
and West before the Industrial Revolution retains much of its intellectual appeal and 
influence. Besides, there still remain a lot of unanswered questions about the economic 
performance of these two parts of the world in the Early Modern Era. One of great 
interest among them is whether “Early globalization” in the West and “Great 
Divergence” between East and West are causally related. Our hypothesis is that they 
are. On the one hand, “Early Globalization” required a certain level of effective political, 
institutional, economic and technological development applied to the functioning of 
grain markets across national borders. On the other hand, since well-functioning 
markets are necessary for economic growth, “Early Globalization” –similarly to the 
subsequent phases of the process in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, albeit less 
intensely- therefore favoured divergence between those countries or regions that took 
 As to Japan, 
Bassino et al. (2011) find that the GDP per capita was less than half that of Great 
Britain by 1700 while in 1800 it had lowered to thirty per cent despite its relatively fast 
growth since 1850. 
                                                        
13 See, among others, Weber (1905:1930), Jones (1981, Landes (1998, 2006) and Maddison 
(2007a, 2007b). 
14 I.e., Wong (1997), Frank (1998), Pomeranz (2000) and Goldstone (2008). 
15 Allen et al., 2011, p. 9. 
16  Morris, 2012, p. 482. Morris’ index of social development accounts for four dimensions 
(energy capture, urbanization, war-making and information technology).  
17 The ongoing revision of the economic growth before 1820 by the Maddison Project takes into 
consideration new quantitative research on the GDP per capita levels in Eurasia and basically 
confirms the pre-revisionist view of Angus Maddison on the gap between East and West –see 
Bolt and Van Zanden, 2013. 
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part in it and those that did not. Thus, “Early Globalization” was made possible by pre-
existing differences between West and East (i.e. better institutions and policies to 
promote foreign trade intensification) and contributed to widen the initial gap in GDP 
per capita between East and West through the direct and indirect economic benefits 
delivered to the latter, but not, or very much less so, to the former by international 
commerce. 
In our view, “Early Globalization” is a particular form of Western exceptionalism. 
This exceptionality consisted of economic policies that supported well-functioning 
national and international markets and therefore fostered. However, the very idea of 
any Western exceptionalism conflicts with the basic conclusions by the revisionist 
school. In particular, regarding grain market performance and, more generally, markets 
allocative efficiency, Shiue and Keller (2007) convincingly claim that “as to the period 
right before the Industrial Revolution took place in Western Europe, grain markets did 
not perform uniformly better in Western Europe than in China.”18 Bassino (2007) also 
concludes that markets in Japan between 1717 and 1857 “were fairly well integrated”.19
The main novelties in this paper with respect to others dealing with market 
integration in the East are firstly of methodological order. Our econometric approach 
provides a metrics that can be used to estimate and compare the integration between 
markets in a given year as well as over a short, medium or long period. Besides, we 
take into account not only domestic market integration but also, and especially, 
international (intra-and intercontinental) market integration in both East and West. 
Developments occurred in the nineteenth-century are considered as well. Additionally, 
we pay attention to the differences in terms of agents of the integration: 1) the leading 
role of the “high Qing” state in the circulation of grain throughout the empire; 2) the 
basically feudal origin of most of the rice traded by the brokers that operated in the 
sophisticated Dojima market of Osaka. Differences in the historical context in which 
integration was reached (e.g., agents, market power and trade policies) matters since 
they had varied consequences for modern economic growth in the East and the West.  
 
Thus, as in other domains, any Western superiority needs to be empirically 
demonstrated rather than a priori assumed. We try to do that by studying market 
integration in some selected grain markets in China and Japan.  
Our study confirms the accuracy of the findings by Shiue and Keller (2007) and 
Bassino (2007). Besides, it complements them by showing some of the limitations of 
the grain market integration reached in the East: mainly, its national, not international, 
geo-economic scope and its stagnation or reversal in the nineteenth century. We infer 
that these limitations are relevant regarding the explanation of why the Great 
Divergence between East and West took place before the Industrial Revolution.  
 
 
2. Econometric methodology and empirical results 
 
In this section, we present the sample of grain (wheat and rice) price series used 
and the methodology, models and results of our statistical analysis.  
We consider markets for wheat in the West: three not yet considered in England 
(Eton, Exeter and Winchester) and those (Amsterdam and Holland, Arévalo, Gdansk, 
London and Southern England, Milan, Pennsylvania, Strasbourg and Vienna) 
previously analyzed in depth in Dobado et al. (2012). On the other side, we also 
include in the sample eleven markets for rice in the East: eight in Japan (Osaka, 
Fukuchiyama, Bocho, Kumamoto, Nagoya, Aizu, Rural Banshu, Hiroshima, Saga Edo, 
Shinshu and Dewa) and three in China (Yangtze river delta, Jiangsu and Hunan). The 
selection of markets responds to a mixed criterion: data availability and geographical 
representativeness. The markets in England, Japan and China will be mainly used with                                                         
18 Shiue and Keller, 2007, p. 1205.  
19 Bassino, 2007, p. 19. 
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the purpose of a national integration comparison. The rest of the markets will be used 
for the purpose of inter- and intracontinental comparison. We work with long yearly 
data series covering most of the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries for most 
markets. Data sources are shown in Appendix 1.20
As units of measure, we convert original prices into prices in terms of grams of 
silver per liter for both West and East.  
 
The steps of our methodology for analyzing the evolution of market integration are 
presented in Table 1. A detailed explanation can be found in Dobado et al. (2012). 
Broadly speaking, we check that (log) nominal prices are cointegrated and follow the 
Law of One Price (LOP), through nonstationarity tests applied to the logarithm of 
nominal and relative prices (log(Pit) and log(Pit / Pjt), respectively). 21
Our analysis starts by studying the nonstationarity of all (log) nominal grain prices 
included in the sample. In a second step, we test the nonstationarity of (log) relative 
prices for every combination of wheat/rice nominal prices that were previously 
identified as I(1). By first confirming the I(1) property of nominal prices and then the 
stationarity of relative prices, the cointegrating relationship and cointegration parameter 
equal to -1 are jointly tested, which is conceptually preferable and statistically more 
efficient. The cointegration relationship between two (log) nominal prices with 
cointegrating parameter equal to -1 is closely related to the LOP. If the log price 
differential is stationary, log(Pit) - log(Pjt) = εijt, where εijt is a zero-mean stationary 
process, then the log relative price is also stationary, log(Pit / Pjt) = εijt. The latter is the 
mathematical representation of the stochastic and dynamic notion of the LOP in strong 
form: in an 
 When nominal 
prices are cointegrated, we take advantage of the fact that the more integrated a 
market is the less effect unpredictable shocks have on relative prices between pairs of 
markets. Bearing that in mind, we study the evolution over time of the dispersion of the 
residuals obtained from fitting an ARMA model to relative prices. Obviously, if two 
nominal prices have different order of integration then the LOP does not hold and we 
conclude that they cannot be integrated from an economic point of view.  
efficient market, all identical goods have the same price in the long run. 
However, the empirical analysis will show that the relative prices analyzed suffer 
transitory fluctuations around a long run constant nonzero mean. This situation refers 
to a weaker version of the LOP that permits imperfect competition, trade barriers and 
transport costs. The effect of these transaction costs in relative prices is captured by 
the nonzero mean. From now on in the paper, the term LOP will always refer to this 
weaker form. We therefore agree with Persson (1999), Ejrnaes and Persson (2000) 
and Shiue and Keller (2007) that cointegration provides substantial evidence in favor of 
market integration. 22
If the hypothesis that LOP holds cannot be rejected –and only in that case-, we 
then focus on the dispersion of the unpredictable shocks affecting the relative prices. In 
this third step of our empirical analysis, we interpret the residuals of the (log) relative 
price univariate models as the net idiosyncratic shocks of the nominal prices. Földváry 
and Van Leeuwen (2010) convincingly discuss the advantages of using the dispersion 
 However, in our paper we are more demanding, as we also 
require the cointegration parameter to be equal to -1, i.e., we require the LOP to hold. 
This part of our analysis encompasses steps 1 and 2 in Table 1.  
                                                        
20 We acknowledge the generosity of those authors that made available their own and others’ 
data to the academic community through the web pages of the International Institute for Social 
History and the Global Price and Income History Group. Allen’s work deserves special 
recognition regarding our work. All authors to which we are grateful are mentioned in Appendix 
1.  
21 Series of nominal or relative prices are logarithmically transformed to avoid heteroskedasticity 
related to increasing mean. We test the nonstationarity using Shin and Fuller (1998) statistic on 
a fitted ARMA model.    
22  However, the economic interpretation of cointegration is not self evident –see Federico 
(2008). We agree with him that cointegration is not a sufficient condition of market integration. 
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of these residuals instead of other commonly utilized statistical approaches –e.g., 
coefficients of variation- for measuring market efficiency. In this respect, the residual 
variance will reflect the share of unforeseeable shocks in total variance, i.e., the effect 
of unexpected events on relative price volatility. If markets are very integrated, 
unexpected events on the nominal prices should have a reduced effect on relative 
prices. Consequently, decreasing trend-like behavior in the Standard Deviation of the 
Innovations (SDI) of the relative prices between pairs of markets will be interpreted as 
an increasing market’s ability to cope with the effect of shocks on nominal prices and 
therefore as increasing integration between those pairs of markets 
Finally, the study of the residual dispersion obtained from the estimated (log) 
relative price models was carried out through the evolution over time of the SDI 
calculated with rolling windows of 35 observations for every relative price (e.g., 
Osaka/Edo, Pennsylvania/London, etc.).23
Our methodology is based on the ARMA representation of the price series.
 In any figure where the SDI is drawn (see, 
for instance Figure 1), each point at year t represents the standard deviation of that 
residual and the previous thirty-four residuals. 
24
We only use univariate analysis of log relative prices to study pairwise 
cointegration relationships between markets. This has a clear advantage with respect 
to VAR, VARMA or any other multivariate representation in terms of simplicity in the 
specification and interpretation. The empirical identification for log(Pit / Pjt), where Pit 
and Pjt represent two log nominal wheat (or rice) price series, reveals that most log 
relative prices are stationary, i.e., integrated of order zero. In these cases the 
cointegration with cointegrating parameter equal to -1 is confirmed (i.e., the West). A 
significant exception must be pointed to this result: the Chinese rice series are not 
cointegrated with the Japanese ones. 
 We 
find that all the log nominal prices, log(Pit), present a stochastic trend that can be 
removed by taking differences, i.e., they are integrated of order one. 
Our main empirical findings and their interpretation are enumerated below: 
1) The econometric analysis shows that the markets in England were highly 
integrated. The evolution of the SDI of the residuals obtained from the ARMA models 
of the log relative prices (which is our dynamic measure of integration) confirms this 
fact. Figure 3 shows that the integration reached levels of 4% and below before 1800. 
This is not surprising, as England probably was the most integrated –and certainly the 
most dynamic- economy of the world by that time. What could be more surprising is 
that Jiangsu and Yangtze Delta River, which are 185 miles far from each other -quite 
similar to the 170 miles distance between Eton and Exeter-, were nearly as integrated 
as the English ones by 1800 –see Figure 4. This result coincides with those presented 
by Shiue and Keller (2007) about the comparison between the integration level in some 
Chinese provinces and England around the end of the eighteenth Century. On the 
other hand, markets in Japan show a significant national integration level as well, 
which is consistent with Bassino (2007). As an example, the integration degree 
between Osaka and Hiroshima (within a distance range of less than 200 miles from 
each other and therefore comparable with the representative markets selected for 
China and England) stays consistently below 10% during the second half of the 
eighteenth century –see Figure 5. That level was certainly higher than those of 
Eton/Exeter and Jiangsu/Yangtze, but still indicates a significant degree of integration if                                                         
23 Different values for the size of the rolling window were tried. Obviously, the higher are the 
values, the smoother are the series. This does not change the trend of the standard deviations 
but the minimum and maximums are more difficult to identify. 
24 The specification is carried out using simple and partial autocorrelation functions, and AIC 
(Akaike, 1974) and HQ (Hannan and Quinn, 1979) information criteria. The results of the 
parameter estimation and hypothesis tests are reported in Appendix 2, Table A.2. Additionally, 
we carried out an analysis with the same series in local currencies that is available from the 
authors upon request. The findings were very similar and the conclusions do not vary 
significantly. 
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compared with that between markets in different continents in the West –see Figures 1 
and 2- estimated by Dobado et al. (2012); or, as could be expected, with respect to 
other, more distant pairs of domestic markets in Japan (as can be seen in Figure 5). 
Thus, national integration level was relatively similar (at least in short or medium 
distances) in England, China and Japan (being a little bit lower in the latter).  
Regarding integration between less proximate markets in China and Japan, we 
can see that distance was an important drawback: the integration degree between 
Yangtze/Hunan or Osaka/Aizu (about 675 and 400 miles away from each other, 
respectively) was considerably lower than in the above-mentioned cases of closer 
proximity (see Figures 4 and 5). Albeit distance –as well as geographical obstacles- 
always constitutes an impediment to market integration, it was probably much more so 
in Japan than in China or England because they were reinforced by intentional 
measures taken by the government such as the prohibition of constructing large 
tonnage vessels (Bassino, 2007), restrictions on wheeled traffic (Vaporis, 1994), etc.        
2) In this second point we deepen in how these three countries (England, China 
and Japan) reached substantially high national degrees of integration. We will briefly 
explain the main differences between the fundamentals of markets functioning that led 
to domestic markets integration. Behind the different levels and dynamics of grain 
market integration across East and West we find three institutional models: i) markets 
(domestic as well as foreign) had since relatively early in the eighteenth century a 
much more important role as allocative mechanisms in Europe and the US (“market-led 
integration”); ii) in China the state, through tribute in kind, ever normal granaries, stock 
accumulation, public works, relief policy, etc., was the leading force, especially during 
the “golden Qing” epoch, behind the systematic redistribution of grain between 
(basically from South to North) and within (mainly in Northern areas) regions and 
economic groups (from producers to consumers) in a rather than not closed  economy 
(“state-controlled integration”); 25
Thus, significant levels of national grain markets integration were achieved in 
different ways and with diverse short and long term effects on the economic behaviour 
of grain consumers and producers and, hence, on the ability of the country’s economy 
to generate modern economic growth. The Chinese “state-controlled integration” 
seems to have been more efficient at limiting the consequences of bad harvests on the 
commoners. However, in the nineteenth century, it could barely survive to the loss of 
political and economic power by the state and did not favor the modernization of the 
Chinese institutional framework during the late Qing dynasty.
 iii) Tokugawa Japan presents a nearly autarchic 
economy in which rice originated as feudal payments by peasants to the samurai class 
reached a well-integrated and sophisticated market (in Osaka, the world first futures 
markets was regulated by the Shogunate as early as in 1730) (“feudal/Dojima 
integration”).  
26
3) In this third argument we relate the previous point and new findings with the 
Great Divergence. As we have shown above, one possible reason that could have 
contributed to the Great Divergence was the completely different institutional (agents 
and policies) mechanisms that drove the national integration in West and East. Now we 
 In Japan, a domestic 
rice market isolated from foreign competition and dominated by the landing class 
caused a high price level that in turn was at the bottom of social unrest and hurt the 
economy of Tokugawa Japan. The Western model was less sophisticated than the 
Japanese and, especially during the transition from medieval to modern regulation of 
grain markets, inferior to the Chinese at providing relief in case of famine. 
Notwithstanding, it proved to be more conductive for raising living standards in the long 
run and bringing about sustainable economic growth.  
                                                        
25 See among others Will (1990), Wong (1997), Shiue (2005) and Li (2000, 2007). 
26  In contrast with long-term fiscal developments in the Western countries, the Qing state 
collected the same amount of per capita tax revenue in terms of grams of silver in 1650-1699 as 
in 1850-1899 (Brandt et al. 2012). 
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present a second important finding that supports this fact and add another argument to 
explain the divergence between these two parts of the world. Coming back to England, 
our econometric results show that not only the domestic integration was high and 
increasing along the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but also the international 
(continental and intercontinental) integration improved quickly. Dobado et al. (2012) 
show that Europe and British North-America increased their intercontinental integration 
levels during the second half of the eighteenth century –see Figures 1 and 2. This 
process was interrupted by the French Revolutionary and the Napoleonic Wars and 
was kept in a standby position during the Corn Laws. However, the process resumed 
faster than before from the middle of the nineteenth century to the end of the Century. 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 illustrate how the effect of distance and other transaction costs 
on integration decreased as a result of the canonical period of globalization. By 1900, 
the degree of market integration between Holland/London and Pennsylvania/London 
reached levels of roughly 7%.  
On the contrary, nothing similar occurred in the East. As a matter of fact, when 
we analyze the relation between rice Japanese and Chinese markets, the cointegration 
is clearly rejected.27
The disconnection between markets within the East was caused by the restrictive 
trade policies adopted by the Qing and Tokugawa states. These policies responded 
basically to political goals and contrast with those that were being adopted in the West 
and resulted in the “Early Globalization” that becomes, then, a form of Western 
exceptionalism in terms of market functioning and allocative efficiency. Important as it 
is, the absence of international integration of grain markets in the East during the 
eighteenth century has not yet played any part in the debate on the “Great 
Divergence”. However, it prevented China and Japan from obtaining the direct and 
indirect economic benefits delivered to the West by the increase in foreign trade before 
the Industrial Revolution and contributed to the “Great Divergence”. Closing the 
economies of the East during the Early Modern Era was one of the main economic 
policy mistake ever made.  
 No statistical –neither historical for that matter- evidence is found 
of any similarity whatsoever in the long-run behavior of rice prices between these two 
countries, despite being separated by about 560 miles (from Yangtze to Kagoshima) 
across the East China Sea. This finding is quite surprising since an almost permanent 
positive differential in prices existed between Osaka and the Yangtze river delta. This 
differential was higher than the one existing between Western markets. It is then 
difficult to understand the economic rationale, if any, behind the absence of grain trade 
from China to Japan. Moreover, on top of the quasi-constant differential in prices that 
would explain systematic exports of rice from the Yangtze delta river to Osaka, 
occasional short-term changes in the relative price between the two markets were 
large enough as to make punctual arbitrage potentially very profitable. This substantial 
potential for trade within the East was far from being exploited during the Early Modern 
Era. On the contrary, the institutional framework of the Early Modern Era allowed for 
trade policies in the West that made possible to exploit narrower margins for 
commercial profits. 
 
 
3. Chief conclusions  
 
1) Despite the geographical proximity and easiness of transportation between 
China and Japan, no statistical evidence of grain market integration between the two 
countries is found. This finding is somewhat unexpected and contrasts with the 
increasing intra-continental and inter-continental integration of grain markets observed                                                         
27 The results of the unit roots and cointegration analyses for all the (log) nominal and relative 
price series are documented in an appendix that can be downloaded from the web page 
www.ucm.es/info/ecocuan/agh/ 
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in the West before 1792 (“Early Globalization”) and after the 1840s (canonical 
globalization). Historical evidence confirms that the two large Eastern markets for grain 
were disconnected: no significant trade in rice between China and Japan on permanent 
basis has been recorded. That neither Korea was integrated with its neighbors is the 
most likely outcome of the policy of seclusion followed by the Choson dynasty from mid 
seventeenth century until late into the nineteenth century. “Early Globalization”, then, 
turns out to be a form of Western exceptionalism. In other words, expanding the 
argument proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2005), the institutional framework established 
in Early Modern Europe permitted, if unevenly, a widespread diffusion of the positive 
effects of trade on economic growth. To a lesser extent and later, this is also the case 
of countries with more absolutist regimes than those of Great Britain, the Netherlands 
and the US, such as Spain, Italy, France, etc. 
2) However, in neither China nor Japan were domestic markets disintegrated. At 
some point during the period under consideration, many markets (e.g., the Yangtze 
river delta or western prefectures of Honshu) were roughly as integrated as many 
advanced European regions (e.g. Southern England). Our findings, then, confirm 
previous research by Shiue and Keller (2007) and Bassino (2007). However, we also 
find that: a) in China, market integration decreases from the 1840s on; b) a similar 
trend (albeit less intense) is observed in Japan form the 1830 to the early 1860s. 
These long-term dynamics are opposed to the one followed by most national markets 
in Western countries before the late nineteenth-century “protectionist backlash” 
(Federico and Persson, 2010). 
3) The state played a central role in the functioning of grain markets in China. 
Besides regulating foreign trade, it mobilized a significant amount of the grain supply 
through the tribute in kind levied on some provinces, accumulated significant stocks to 
be distributed through the vast network of “evernormal granaries”, occasionally sold at 
below-market prices or gave tax relief to some provinces, etc. In Japan, apart from 
restricting foreign trade and controlling the means of transportation that could be used 
for shipments, the state performed a lesser role in grain circulation. On the contrary, 
daimyos and big merchants in Osaka were the main agents operating in a 
sophisticated market that was ultimately based upon the collection of feudal rents in 
kind and its distribution for sales across the country. With all due qualifications, 
markets forces were generally more important in the West as a whole throughout the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Thus, domestic market integration may be 
achieved through different combinations of agents and policies. In turn, each of these 
combinations has specific effects on economic growth.  
4) We identify some important differences between West and East regarding 
market integration: geo-economic scope (intra-continental and inter-continental versus 
national); evolution over time (secular progress versus reversal in the nineteenth 
century); and agents and policies (market forces versus state and others as leading 
forces) and policies (relative openness to foreign trade versus relative closeness). As a 
result, East and West were dissimilar in terms of market integration before and after 
the Industrial Revolution. 
5) That dissimilarity had implications for the appearance of modern economic 
growth. In our interpretation, the above-mentioned differences support the notion that 
the level of intra- and intercontinental of market integration encapsulated by the term 
“early globalization”: a) preceded rather than succeeded the Industrial Revolution in the 
West; b) contributed to, albeit did not cause, the “Great Divergence” between East and 
West. “Early Globalization” soon started to deliver direct and indirect economic benefits 
that were not shared by the East. A higher integration of grain markets between China, 
Korea and Japan in the eighteenth century would have been not only mutually 
beneficial, but also technically and economically possible. It did not happen because of 
political reasons. By closing their economies in the Early Modern Era, the East 
governments might have committed one of the biggest economic policy mistakes ever 
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made, being the lost “early globalization” just part –and probably not the most 
important part- of the total cost in terms of economic growth. 
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Figure 1: Market Integration in the West (London as the numéraire), 1737-1896.  
  
Note: The series are the (log) relative price residual standard deviation calculated using rolling windows span of 35t = . London average is the mean of the other series (the residual standard deviation of the (log) relative price of A/L, H/L, M/L, S/L, G/L, V/L, P/L) at each period t.   Source: See Appendix 1.  
Figure 2: Market Integration in the West (Pennsylvania) as the numéraire),  
1754-1896. 
 
Note: The series are the (log) relative price residual standard deviation calculated using rolling windows span of 35t = . London average is the mean of the other series (the residual standard deviation of the (log) relative price of A/P, H/P, M/P, S/P, G/P, V/P, L/P) at each period t.   Source: See Appendix 1. 
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Figure 3: Market integration in England, 1734-1816. 
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Figure 4: Integration of selected rice markets in China, 1778-1910. 
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Figure 5: Rice market integration in Japan, 1744-1863. 
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Figure 6:  Grain market integration in East and West, 1734-1910. 
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Table 1. Methodological scheme   
Step Hypothesis Interpretation of 
the hypothesis 
Econometric 
tools 
Results 
1 I(1) nominal prices 1 Some shifts in supply or demand imply that price adjustments are necessary to clear the market in the long run 
ARMA models, nonstationarity and noninvertibility tests1  
Rejects: None Accepts: All the Japanese, Chinese, European and American series.  
2 I(0) relative prices 1 
Nominal prices are cointegrated (with cointegrating parameter equal to -1). If so, they follow the Law of One Price (weak form) 
ARMA models, nonstationarity and noninvertibility tests1 
Rejects: Between Chinese and Japanese rice series. Accepts: Between all the wheat series (Europe and America). Between all Chinese rice series. Between all Japanese rice series.  
3 
Decreasing dispersion of  relative prices’ unpredicted shocks 2 
Synchronization of the nominal prices. Market integration through the reduction of arbitrage possibilities during the nineteenth Century. 
Graphical tools2 Rejects: In China and Japan. Accepts: In Europe and Pennsylvania.  
 
Notes: 1The I(1) and I(0) properties of the time series are tested with the nonstationarity Shin and Fuller (1981) test and confirmed with the noninvertibility Davis et al. (1995) test. 2Decreasing dispersion is tested using graphical tools. 3The markets are defined in the section 2. 
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Appendix 1: Sources of data on grain prices. 
Markets in the East: 
Yangtze Delta, 1638-1935: Wang, Y.  (1992), “Secular Trends of Rice Prices in the 
Yangzi Delta, 1638–1935”, Thomas G. Rawski and Lillian M. Li (eds.), Chinese History 
in Economic Perspective, University of California Press, Berkeley, etc., pp. 35-68. 
Original prices in taels (37.3 grams of silver) of silver per shi (103.5 liters) converted 
into grams of silver per liter.  
Jiangsu and Hunan, 1736-1911: Qing-era Grain Price Database, Institute of Modern 
History. Academia Sinica:  
(http://www.mh.sinica.edu.tw/PGDigitalDB_Detail.aspx?htmContentID=29&lang=enUS) 
Original prices in taels (37.3 grams of silver) of silver per shi (103.5 liters) converted 
into grams of silver per liter. These data were kindly facilitated by Cong Liu whose 
generous help we acknowledge. 
Aizu, Banshu (rural), Bocho, Dewa, Osaka, Edo, Fukuchiyama, Hiroshima, 
Kumamoto, Nagoya and Shinshu, 1710-1863: Original prices in ryos (60 monmes) or 
monmes (3.75 grams of silver) per koku (180.391 liters) converted into grams of silver 
per liter.  Source is http://www.iisg.nl/hpw/data.php#japan, accessible through the web 
page of the International Institute of Social History. We appreciate its generosity for 
making available these data to the international academic community 
 
 
Markets in the West:  
 
See Dobado et al. 2102. 
 
 
 
  
 
